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Abstract
We have performed a review of systemic risks in smart cities dependent on intelligent 
and partly autonomous transport systems. Smart cities include concepts such as smart 
transportation/use of autonomous transportation systems (i.e., autonomous cars, sub-
ways, shipping, drones) and improved management of infrastructure (power and water 
supply). At the same time, this requires safe and resilient infrastructures and need for 
global collaboration. One challenge is some sort of risk based regulation of emergent 
vulnerabilities. In this paper we focus on emergent vulnerabilities and discussion of how 
mitigation can be organized and structured based on emergent and known scenarios 
cross boundaries. We regard a smart city as a software ecosystem (SEC), defined as a 
dynamic evolution of systems on top of a common technological platform offering a set 
of software solutions and services. Software ecosystems are increasingly being used to 
support critical tasks and operations. As a part of our work we have performed a system-
atic literature review of safety, security and resilience software ecosystems, in the period 
2007–2016. The perspective of software ecosystems has helped to identify and specify 
patterns of safety, security and resilience on a relevant abstraction level. Significant vul-
nerabilities and poor awareness of safety, security and resilience has been identified. Key 
actors that should increase their attention are vendors, regulators, insurance companies 
and the research community. There is a need to improve private-public partnership and 
to improve the learning loops between computer emergency teams, security information 
providers (SIP), regulators and vendors. There is a need to focus more on safety, security 
and resilience and to establish regulations of responsibilities on the vendors for liabilities.
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1. Introduction
This paper contains a discussion and review of safety, security and resilience of smart cit-
ies, considered as software ecosystem (SEC). The purpose is to provide an overview of 
research in the field, identify emergent risks in a systemic perspective and identify pos-
sible issues that existing literature is not addressing adequately. The article is initiated by 
a discussion of the concept of software ecosystems and the need for safety, security and 
resilience in smart cities.
1.1. Smart cities and software ecosystems
In Ref. [1] there is a fairly general definition of a smart city, described as a place when invest-
ments in human and social capital and traditional (transport) and modern (ICT) communica-
tion infrastructure, fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality of life, with a wise 
management of natural resources, through participatory governance. From [2], looking at 
specific systems, smart cites are described as a city that monitors and integrates conditions of 
its critical infrastructures, traffic (including roads, bridges, tunnels, rails, subways, airports, 
seaports), communications, water, power and major buildings. All this is done in order to 
optimize resources, plan its preventive maintenance and monitor security aspects while maxi-
mizing services to its citizens.
A literature review of software ecosystems in general was performed in [3] identifying 90 
papers in the period from 2007 to 2012. The review identified the software ecosystem (SEC) 
as a fruitful systemic perspective. The review inspired us to find papers discussing safety, 
security and resilience of SEC published in the period from 2007 to 2016.
A software ecosystem (SEC) describes the complex environment of a smart city. A SEC will 
consist of components developed by actors both internally and externally, and solutions will 
spread outside the traditional borders of software companies to a group of companies, pri-
vate persons and entities. In [3] they defined a software ecosystem as: “the interaction of a set 
of actors on top of a common technological platform that results in a number of software solutions or 
services. Each actor is motivated by a set of interests or business models and connected to the rest of the 
actors and the ecosystem as a whole with symbiotic relationships, while, the technological platform is 
structured in a way that allows the involvement and contribution of the different actors….”
When discussing software ecosystems, we include the legal and organizational framework 
in addition to applications and supporting infrastructure as described in Figure 1. Scope of 
digital ecosystems.
Legal and organizational framework 
Applications and Architecture 
Components Data/ Digital Content 
Infrastructure 
Figure 1. Scope of software ecosystems.
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Software ecosystems are often based on the internet as infrastructure. The internet economy 
makes up a significant part of the GDP in 2016 since it is 5.3% of GDP [4]. SEC has gained 
more importance due to mobile platforms such as iPhone and android. Examples of SEC are:
• Digital learning environments;
• Mobile systems (phone applications);
• Shopping and payments systems;
• Social networking systems;
• Personal wellness and healthcare (training, food, medical equipment and surveillance…);
• Smart cities with transportation, infrastructure control (water, power). A part of Smart cit-
ies is intelligent transport systems (ITS) controlling vehicles, traffic management systems, 
electronic payments…;
• “Smart farming” with systems to track livestock and harvest/yield; outside cities.
Arguments for discussing software ecosystems has been the speed of development; increased 
competition and reduction of development costs due to the opening up of development out-
side of organizational silos. Some of the software ecosystems are critical, in that a malfunction 
can severely affect the functioning of society or personal well-being. Examples are systems 
used in transportation, car control systems and health systems (such as pacemakers).
1.2. Safety, security and risks
In this paper we have used the definition of safety as a state, as described by Department of 
Defense - [5], “freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, dam-
age to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.” This definition describes 
safety as being free from conditions causing a mishap or accident, i.e., safety is in some sense 
a “non-event.”
Security is used to describe conditions of intentional harm. The relationships to safety are 
discussed in [6]. Security is defined as “the degree to which malicious harm is prevented, reduced 
and properly reacted to” and safety is defined as “the degree to which accidental harm is prevented, 
reduced and properly reacted to” from [7]. In information systems, there has often been a focus 
on “information security.” Information security is defined as “protecting information and infor-
mation systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in 
order to provide: integrity, confidentiality and availability”, from [8]. Since software ecosystems 
not only handle information, but also actual critical processes in smart cities, in automobiles 
and other applications the software ecosystems must both be secure (i.e., protected from 
malicious harm) and safe (i.e., protected from accidental harm). The systems must be able to 
handle unanticipated risks, and the ecosystem must be able to handle breakdowns and ensure 
that the systems has a safe state and/or a secure state.
In [9], the following definition of risk is given, “Risk: two dimensional combination of the 
consequences (of an activity) and associated uncertainties (what will the outcome). Probabilities 
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are used to express the uncertainties. When risk is quantified in a risk analysis, this definition is 
in line with the ISO/IEC Guide 73 (2002) standard definition [10]: combination of the probability 
of an event and its consequence.” Related to new emerging risks and complexities of interac-
tions, there may be challenging to establish the probability of an event since they may be 
unanticipated.
Systemic risk is defined as “Probability of loss or failure common to all members of a class or group 
or to an entire system.” When discussing systemic risks related to smart cities we are exploring 
failures common to members of a smart city.
A key element when assessing systemic risks are the scope and prioritization of systems to 
be evaluated. We have focused on critical systems of common interest in a city. In the follow-
ing we have discussed risks and protection of what is defined as part of critical infrastruc-
ture. Definition and protection of critical infrastructure has been a key concern in the US and 
EU. In the US the establishment of the national infrastructure protection plan (NIPP) from 
2009 has been updated systematically. The latest, [11], has the title “Partnering for Critical 
Infrastructure – Security and Resilience.” The successive NIPP has identified specific areas 
of concern such as interdependencies, cyber security and the international nature of threats. 
The risk management framework of NIPP is interesting since it is broad and systemic includ-
ing physical, cyber and human elements. In the EU, the directive 114/08 on the identifica-
tion and designation of European critical infrastructure and the assessment of the need to 
improve their protection was established as a council directive in 2008 [12]. In Table 1, we 
have described critical infrastructure sectors.
The main elements and areas of this list of critical infrastructure, is highly relevant when dis-
cussing smart cities, of special interest are smart city applications related to: Transportation 
systems, energy systems (power supply), bank and finance; communication systems; 
Technologies of information (including navigation systems); Water supply and health sys-
tems. The following areas are critical when impacted by loss or failures (Table 2).
The criticality or potential loss due to failures, breakdowns or attacks increases the need to be 
able to support critical operations even when the system is under stress or may fail, thus the 
ability to handle unanticipated incidents (or ability to go to a safe and secure state) are gain-
ing importance. The concept of resilience engineering is an important strategy to handle these 
unanticipated incidents. In [13] resilience is defined as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust 
US-NIPP sectors EU 114/08 sectors
Energy Energy—electricity, oil, natural gas
Transportation systems Transport—roads and highways, 
railroads, aviation, inland waterways, 
shipping and ports
Agriculture and food; bank and finance; communications; military 
installation and defense; technologies of information; national monuments 
and icons; drinking water treatments plans
(NA—not applicable yet)
Table 1. Critical infrastructure sectors in US-NIPP and EU 114/08.
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its functioning prior to or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain operations even 
after a major mishap or in the presence of continuous stress.” In [14], Woods focuses on unantici-
pated disturbances and adaptations, and describes resilience as: “How well can a system handle 
disruptions and variations that fall outside of the base mechanisms/model for being adaptive (adaptive 
defined as the ability to absorb or adapt to disturbance, disruption and change).” The handling of the 
unanticipated and continued functioning has been a key property of resilient systems.
In the European Union, safety, security and resilience are prioritized in the cybersecurity 
strategy [15]. Three of the top five strategic issues mentioned are: Develop the industrial and 
technological resources for cybersecurity; Achieving cyber resilience; and establish a coherent 
international cyberspace policy for the EU. Thus, safety, security and resilience of smart cities 
are important issues that should be explored further. In addition, it is important to under-
stand how risk governance of smart cities is addressed and established in order to support a 
coherent cyberspace policy of the key issues.
2. Problem definition and methods
Based on the preceding introduction, and the summary above, the three research questions 
we wanted to explore are:
Areas impacted by smart cities Examples of critical loss or failures
Transportation systems—Intelligent transportation, 
management and control of transport being impacted 
by surveillance, Google Map used to recommend routes, 
autonomous transport, traffic control centers managing 
transport and road signals
Breakdown of transport; impacting emergency 
services (police, fire, ambulance) or flow of material. 
(trough exploiting vulnerabilities in autonomous car 
systems; or influencing traffic control systems/halting 
control systems)
Energy systems—smart metering and improved 
management through centralized or more technology-
based power grid systems
Breakdown of power supply – breakdown of power 
grids through exploiting vulnerabilities in new 
technology, on a control level and in smart metering 
systems
Bank and finance—many areas—one example payments 
systems integrated in toll roads and parking to manage 
traffic (reduce traffic in selected areas) and to make parking 
more user friendly and efficient
Breakdown of payment systems, halting/delaying key 
services
Communication systems and technologies of information 
(including navigation systems)—autonomous cars, traffic 
control, route planning and signaling systems dependent 
on information technology and navigation systems.
Breakdown (accidents) in transportation due to 
nonfunctioning supporting technology
Water supply—managed and optimized by control systems Breakdown, contamination of water supply due 
breakdown (hacking) of control systems
Health systems—dependent on sensors (such as in 
pacemakers) and communication systems (sending and 
receiving data from health professionals), “just in time” 
management of health,
Breakdown/errors in health systems used to manage 
critical operations, such as in peacemakers
Table 2. Systemic risks in smart cities.
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• RQ1: How is safety, security and risks of smart cities (software ecosystems of cities) framed 
and defined?
• RQ2: How is risk governance of smart cities (software ecosystems of cities) addressed?
• RQ3: What are key issues in Governance of the ecosystem?
In the following we have described some of the challenges and problems of these research 
questions and our methodology (i.e., approach).
2.1. Challenges and problems
There is often poor focus on emerging risks, safety and security. These issues have been 
identified late when vulnerabilities have been exploited and unwanted incidents have been 
published. The suppliers and vendors (software vendors) seldom has to pay for unwanted 
incidents even if they are due to poor quality issues in the systems such as safety, security or 
resilience. The bill has been given to the users, the organizations and/or society.
Critical infrastructure is in most cases regulated by the authorities. Safety and security regula-
tion is often reactive, and lags technological innovation. New software is implemented and 
societal consequences are discussed later. Internet of things (IoT) is an example of new tech-
nology that are introduced in software ecosystems that may affect operations of critical infra-
structure. IoT has introduced a broad set of vulnerabilities and can challenge safety, security 
and resilience of software ecosystems. As an example the Mirai botnet was used in a Denial 
of service (DoS) attack on the internet firm Dyn, Ref. [16], using unsecured devices on a large 
scale. The attack affected Dyn’s clients such as Twitter, Reddift, Spotify, and SoundCloud. The 
cyber-attacks caused outages across the whole East Coast in the US in October 2016. When 
discussing vulnerabilities in a software ecosystem such as in smart cities, one challenge is that 
there is not one single supplier, but a set of suppliers that must be involved. Incident handling 
moves to a broader area where it can be difficult to identify responsibilities and manage com-
petencies. This is relevant, in [17] the author points out that there are serious vulnerabilities 
(poor quality control) in systems used in smart cities (i.e., traffic control systems), which could 
be used to cause traffic jams or collisions.
2.2. Methodology
The literature review started by a keyword search based on combination of “software ecosys-
tems” “smart cities” and “safety, security, resilience.” Using Google Scholar and then search-
ing the ACM Digital Library, IEEE Explore, Springer Link and Science Direct. The literature 
body was selected based on that software ecosystems/smart cities and safety (security and 
resilience) was the main theme. In addition, papers were selected based on a set of criteria i.e., 
have been peer reviewed and published in a scientific context (journal, conference), available 
in English, and more than one-page long. Since software ecosystems involves governmental 
rules, relevant white papers were also identified. The identified literature body is gathered in 
Section 5, numbered from [18–29] [LIT BODY:13] and [LIT BODY:14]. In addition, we have 
listed other general references that could not be included in the literature body, in Section 6.
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The concept of Risk and Risk Governance has been an issue in the review, and we have 
structured papers based on risk governance, see [30], starting with problem framing; then 
risk appraisal (hazards and vulnerabilities); risk judgment; risk communication and risk 
management.
3. Findings and reflections
We found 14 papers in total, 13 papers published in the interval 2007–2016; and we included 
a paper from 2003 that had an illuminating discussion of resilience of systems. The following 
three sections are based on our research questions (RQ1 to RQ3 as described in Section 2) and 
have been used as title of the chapter:
• Framing of safety, security and risks in smart cities (RQ1)
• Risk Governance of smart cities (software ecosystems) (RQ2)
• What are key issues in Governance of the ecosystem? (RQ3)
3.1. Framing of safety, security and risks
In [31] there is a discussion of the convergence of safety and security, pointing out that a suc-
cessful integration of both requirements needs the collaboration of both safety and security 
disciplines, aided by a common understanding. In [28, 32], it is pointed out that both safety 
and security issues must be assessed to build trustworthy software ecosystems. Issues identi-
fied through security analysis (i.e., threats) must be combined with issues from safety analysis 
(i.e., hazards). In [33] there is a focus on of the development of industrial control systems and 
how safety and security must be integrated in the development methodologies. These control 
systems are similar to control systems employed in smart cities. An overview and comparison 
of methodologies is given.
In [34], a broad overview of security and safety challenges of digital systems are given based 
on an ecological perspective. Ecology is used both as a metaphor to learn from the develop-
ment in the nature, but also to have a more holistic perspective of systems involving human 
actors in a society. The ecosystem perspective is as an important viewpoint when discussing 
safety and security in a changing word, and especially when exploring risks and risk gover-
nance of smart cities.
In [35] there is a discussion of infrastructure resilience from an organizational context. 
Adaptive capacity, resource robustness is discussed related to infrastructure and a conceptual 
framework for assessing resilience is outlined. The conceptual framework seems to be useful 
when discussing resilience in software ecosystems, especially of critical (infrastructure) eco-
systems. In [36] different elements of resilience are discussed. The paper presents a framework 
for system resilience, consisting of five aspects: time periods, system types, events, resilience 
actions and properties to preserve. It is followed by principles for emergence, and factors 
affecting resilience, including improving resilience, trade-offs, and loss of resilience.
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Not many textbooks (that can be used in teaching) have been found related to implementa-
tion of security and resilience in control systems of smart cities. However, in [37] guidelines 
for secure and resilient software development are discussed. The development guidelines are 
targeted toward software ecosystems; and the goal is to improve developer skills related to 
security and resilience. It is pointed out that security and resilience must be integrated from 
concept/early design, it reviews security design methodologies and suggests how to measure 
the development process. The discussion of security in Industrial Automation setting, is dis-
cussed in [38], including the challenges of adapting general software security principles to 
industrial automation and control systems.
In [29] resilience and cyber security of the ecosystems is seen as a part of the maturity of gov-
ernance and collaboration between industry and government. Thus, cyber resilience is seen 
as the next step of cyber security.
In [24] there is a discussion of the security dynamics of software ecosystem (SEC), pointing 
out that SEC reduces cost and are increasing efficiencies for the software producers while 
society get the costs of software failures (i.e., issues related to security, safety and poor resil-
ience). The paper has a quantitative examination of 27,000 vulnerabilities disclosed over the 
past decade (1996–2008). The paper identifies the interest of several stakeholders in the mar-
ket of software vulnerabilities such as the vendors, safety experts/consultants, security infor-
mation providers (SIP), and criminals. The paper explores several policies such as security 
trough obscurity, responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities (as a suggested policy) or security 
trough transparency. One of the key insights is that secrecy prevents people from assessing 
their own risks, which contributes to a false sense of security. The process of responsible dis-
closure is that the researcher discloses full information to the vendor, expecting that a patch 
is developed within a reasonable timeframe. An increasing number of vendors and security 
organizations have adopted some form of responsible disclosure. The role of security infor-
mation providers (SIP) as risk-communicators is discussed in the vulnerabilities market.
In summary, there has been a positive development in identifying the need to explore both 
safety and security in development and to use resilience as a mitigating strategy. The concept 
of software ecosystems benefits the developers and industries, but it seems that at present 
that society gets the costs of software failures. Responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities to the 
vendors, expecting a patch, seems to be a beneficial policy. The role of actors in the software 
ecology, such as security information providers should be explored further.
3.2. Risk governance of smart cities (software ecosystems) –vulnerabilities and risks
In [26] a set of vulnerabilities in cars are pointed out such as the possibility to control a wide 
range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input from dashboard, including 
disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, 
and so on. Attacks were easy to perform and the effects were significant. It is possible to 
bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, and perform attack that 
embeds malicious code in the car that will completely erase any evidence of its presence (after 
a crash). There is a discussion of the challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while con-
sidering the existing automotive ecosystem.
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In [27] Semi-autonomous and fully autonomous cars are described as coming from the 
development stage to actual operations. The autonomous systems are creating safety and 
security challenges. These challenges require a holistic analysis, under the perspective of 
ecosystems of autonomous vehicles. The perspective of ecosystems is seen as useful to 
understand and mitigate security and safety challenges. These systems will become impor-
tant critical information infrastructures, simultaneously featuring connectivity, autonomy 
and cooperation. Threat analyses and safety cases should include both (random) faults and 
(purposeful) attacks.
In [39], there is a discussion of Cyber-Physical infrastructure risks in the future smart cities. 
Several examples of unwanted incidents are described in transportation systems (autono-
mous vehicles; Trains; …) in electricity distribution and management and in the water and 
wastewater systems sector. It is suggested to the regulator to work with standards and regu-
lations in addition to communication and increased engagement by giving direct assistance. 
Challenges mentioned are the need to establish goal based standards and regulations as new 
technology is implemented and to focus on dissemination of best practices in combination 
with systematic education.
In [17] there is an empirical evaluation of “smart cities” looking at a broad set of technologies 
of traffic control, management of energy/water/waste and security. Known vulnerabilities are 
in traffic control systems, mobile applications used by citizens, smart grids/smart meters and 
video cameras. The issues are in line with peer-reviewed papers, i.e., lack of cyber security 
testing and approval, lack of encryption, lack of City Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERT), and lack of cyber attack emergency plans. There are reasons to anticipate that we 
establish potential for serious incidents, if these issues are not addressed and mitigated.
In [20] there is a discussion of the expanded use of federated embedded systems (FES) in auto-
motive and process automation. Expected benefits include the possibility of third-party actors 
developing add-on functionality; a shorter time to market for new functions; and the ability 
to upgrade existing products in the field. This is a substantial area for innovation and change, 
the responsibilities of the manufacturer will change, and a key challenge will be ecosystem 
management. However, it is suggested that the liabilities and responsibilities of the total 
product must rest with the manufacturer. The regulator has a key role to define responsibili-
ties. These issues highlight the need for Risk Governance of systems to be used in smart cities.
In [21] open software ecosystem is proposed as an approach to develop software for embed-
ded systems in the automotive industry. The focus is on the need to deliver functionality to 
customers faster. The paper describes quality attributes and defines a reference architecture. 
Both safety, security and dependability are explored.
In [22] they model the architecture of a cloud-based ecosystem, showing security patterns for 
its main components; and discuss the value of such an approach. The ecosystem approach 
provides a holistic view and is valuable in security, by indicating places where security 
mechanisms can be attached. Holistic views are seen as important to combine quality factors 
such as safety and reliability with security. By using this abstraction level, it is argued in the 
paper that this unified approach reduces complexity, one of the important weaknesses used 
by attackers and can enable analysis of the propagation of threats and data leaks.
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In [28] they cover research on Enterprise Architectures of ecosystems (i.e., software ecosys-
tems) discussing resilience and adaptability as a key area and suggest reference architectures 
mentioning security. However, safety is not mentioned.
In [25] there is a discussion on how to build robust and evolvable resilient software systems, 
discussing redundant data structures, transformer middleware and service-oriented commu-
nities. The use of transformer middleware may lead to more complex systems and higher 
costs or latency. Exploration of service-oriented communities may support adaptation and 
spontaneous emergence of resilience, but may lead to higher costs due to high degree of 
redundancy and challenges with deterministic behavior.
In summary, there has been documented several vulnerabilities in smart cities, intelligent 
transport systems and autonomous cars. However, software ecosystems have beneficial ele-
ments since more actors are developing functionality and enabling a shorter time to market. 
Liabilities must rest on the manufacturer and the regulator must define responsibilities. 
The ecosystem provides a holistic view that is seen as important to combine safety and reli-
ability with security. It is argued in several papers that this approach reduces complexity; 
one of the weaknesses used by attackers and can enable improved analysis of propagation 
of threats and data leaks.
3.3. Key issues in governance—responsibilities, management and communication
International governance of security of the infrastructure of software ecosystems is addressed 
through several channels such as standards (ISO, IEC) or international bodies such as OECD, 
EU, NATO and UN. Software Ecosystems are international—involving many actors with dif-
ferent agendas. In [40] there is a discussion of governance of emerging technology (such as 
IoT) as it is integrated into critical infrastructure. It is suggested that manufacturers should 
follow the principle of privacy and security by design, when developing new products, 
and must be prepared to accept legal liability for the quality of the technology they pro-
duce. Buyers should collectively demand that manufacturers respond effectively to concerns 
about privacy and security. Governments can play a positive role by incorporating minimum 
security standards in their procurement. It is suggested that government regulations should 
require routine, transparent reporting of technological problems to provide the data required 
for a transparent market-based cyber-insurance industry. It is suggested to establish an agree-
ment (a compact) based on collaboration between government, industry and private society 
supporting evidence based decision making.
In [19] the focus is on software assurance of safety-critical and security-critical software (i.e., 
conceptualized as SEC). The perception is that the use of current methods has not achieved 
the wished-for level of protection, and that there are missing security principles and stan-
dards. The industry continues to see an expansion of major breaches occurring in both the 
public and private sectors. There need to be incentives or regulations for implementing pro-
tective and immunizing measures. Such measures could be a mandatory part of the security 
architecture of all applications. A formal requirement could be that implementation of pro-
tective and immunizing measures is included in any certification process. On governance it 
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is suggested to establish software assurance standards at the UN level; to have a risk based 
approach; to share best of breed methods; and the need to discuss liabilities for damages 
occurring as a result of an attack or security-related errors.
In [18] the issue of Information security is highlighted in national governance. They pro-
pose a comprehensive conceptual framework for building a robust, resilient and dependable 
Information Security Infrastructure, based on the perspective of software ecosystems.
Development of security and resilience is seen as a maturity process in [41], referencing the 
CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT RMM) from the Carnegie Mellon Software 
Engineering Institute. Resilience as a strategy is not simple to implement, in [42], the analy-
sis of resilience strategies in the US agencies revealed that most of the plans only focus on a 
few of the stages of resilience. Plans do not focus on resilience in the information and social 
domain, and do not consider long-term adaptation.
In [23] there is a discussion of resilience as a high level design principle. There is an argument 
for resilience in systems, i.e., distributed systems composed of independent yet interactive 
elements may deliver equivalent or better functionality with greater resilience. Guidelines for 
resilience are given such as robustness through resilience rather than resistance, and interven-
tion rather than control. It is argued for the perspective of resilience and to use an ecological 
perspective in system design and deployment, thus this article describes a design methodol-
ogy on the ecology level based on resilience principles.
In [43] there is a discussion of development of software-systems, and ignoring some perspec-
tives of software ecosystems. If we want systems that are secure and reliable, both security 
and reliability must be built together. Applications, middleware and operating systems must 
be built in the same way, to get systems that are inherently secure and that can withstand 
attacks from malicious applications and resist errors. The suggested approach is based on 
security patterns that are mapped through the architectural levels.
3.4. Key issues related to methods of risk assessments
The papers identified that the risk assessment was complex, thus there is a need to use meth-
ods that integrates the following issues:
• Technology, ensuring that scope of methodology includes safety issues (such as described 
by IEC 61508 - Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-
related Systems) security issues (ISA/IEC-62443 to ensure secure Industrial Automation 
and Control Systems) in addition to a Certification Framework such as the European IACS 
components Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF).
• Human Elements: Risk understanding and perceptions of the involved actors, including 
understanding of both safety issues and security issues
• Organizational issues, ensuring that responsibilities are in place, and that necessary orga-
nizational structures are in place both to specify, implement, operate and handle deviations 
critical components of the system.
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In summary, if we want systems that are secure and reliable, both security and reliability 
must be built together. The suggested approach is based on security patterns that are mapped 
through the architectural levels of the system. However, there is missing international regula-
tion or compacts based on private public partnerships to ensure privacy, safety, security and 
resilience. Vendors must ensure this quality by design, and must be prepared to accept legal 
liability for the quality of the technology they produce. Regulations should require routine, 
transparent reporting of technological problems to provide data for a transparent market-
based cyber-insurance industry. There is an argument for resilience in systems, composed of 
independent yet interactive elements that may deliver equivalent or better functionality with 
greater resilience. However, the maturity of resilience in use is varying.
4. Summary
In this review, we have used the concept of software ecosystems on systems used in smart 
cities. Our review indicates that the “smart cities” concept are vulnerable and subject to 
increased emerging risks due to introduction of new technology (such as autonomous trans-
port systems) unsecured components and new connections that has not been foreseen or 
thought of. Threats, new vulnerabilities and new unwanted incidents are emerging and can 
be observed through media attention and exploration.
Software assurance of safety-critical and security-critical software (conceptualized as the 
software system ecosystem) is strongly needed. Current methods have not achieved the nec-
essary level of protection, and are missing security principles and standards. The industry 
continues to see an expansion of major breaches occurring in both the public and private sec-
tors. Incentives or regulations are needed to implement protective and immunizing measures.
The ecosystem approach seems a promising approach since it provides a holistic view of secu-
rity needs, by indicating places where security mechanisms can be attached. This approach 
reduces complexity; one of the important weaknesses used by attackers and can enable analy-
sis of the propagation of threats and data leaks.
Due to the increased proliferation of the IoT and the vulnerability of the Internet, there is a 
strong need to establish a social compact (agreement) ensuring that the Internet continues to be 
accessible, inclusive, secure and trustworthy. To ensure that all actors in the value-chain under-
stand the vulnerabilities and the risks, a silo-based “need to know” principle must be replaced 
by transparent and open reporting. This may support a market based cyber-insurance industry.
In the literature body and in [32] there is an increased understanding of the need for col-
laboration between the safety and security disciplines to understand and mitigate risks and 
vulnerabilities. The differences in perspectives between security and safety are due to differ-
ent adversity models. The security community addresses threats (directed, deliberate, hostile 
acts) and the safety community addresses hazards (undirected events). Software ecosystems 
are so pervasive across all sectors of economic activity that this silo approach can no longer 
be regarded as acceptable.
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There is a need for international rulemaking and regulation. This may be difficult to achieve. 
Vendors must ensure safety, security and resilience by design, and must be prepared to accept 
legal liability for the quality of the technology they produce. Prescriptive and detailed rule-
making on a national level is missing and is difficult to achieve. This is an international chal-
lenge. The Mira denial of service (DoS) attack was due to components produced in China but 
used in the US. No penetration testing, acceptance or testing of robustness was performed 
prior to release of the product.
In general, there is a need to establish functional standards, responsibilities of liabilities and 
practices cross-countries. There must be a specific responsibility of the producer to ensure 
safety, security and resilience, and ideally, a formal process of product acceptance or certifica-
tion or safety case exploration before a product can be sold or offered. Thus, there is a need 
for regulatory action from government to set minimum standards, establish responsibility, 
and follow up of incidents/accidents. The suppliers should establish a proactive focus on (best 
practice) safety/security standards.
In Table 3, we have exemplified critical ecosystems such as smart cities/intelligent transport 
systems. Based on our review so far, these critical systems have no mandated test criteria 
(neither safety cases nor security cases, thus it is described as “Poor”) and there are no orga-
nizations such as CERTS to handle and systematize unwanted incidents.
Development of safety has often been dependent on exploration of publicized accidents 
and incidents, and a systematic learning loop between users, the regulator and industry. An 
important component in the learning loop of software systems has been structured reporting 
and analysis of incidents trough computer incident response teams, i.e., CERTS. There is a 
need to regulate and ensure that new technology is approved/tested (has some sort of quality 
control/safety case examination) and that there is some sort of a structured learning process 
when incidents happen.
Software ecosystems will be exposed to new strains as new unsecured technology are intro-
duced—thus there must be an increased focus on how to handle surprises i.e., resilience 
and adaptability in software ecosystems to ensure that new demands/stress/failures are not 
impacting the infrastructure in a catastrophic way. In the review of resilience, [44], there is 
an increased use of resilience in papers from 2006 on. The resilience concepts are in develop-
ment, and there is a need to be careful not to place the responsibility of resilience on the indi-
vidual (i.e., expecting resilience from an individual only). Resilience is the integrated ability 
of the ecosystem as a whole consisting of an interplay between technology abilities, organiza-
tional abilities and human abilities. During the review process, several issues have not been 
addressed adequately, and are in need of further research, such as:
Ecosystem Vulnerability Test CERT
Smart cities and intelligent transport systems Disruption of services (transport, power, water) Poor No
Table 3. Critical digital ecosystems and learning.
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• There has not been an exploration of the different actors that can affect safety, security and 
resilience in smart cities (i.e., software ecosystems). Such an exploration should give insight 
into how to improve safety, security and resilience of systems, and how liabilities should 
be placed
• There has been no systematic discussion of the maturation of resilience in smart cities (spe-
cifics in software ecosystems) discussing technology, organizations and human awareness/
human actions together
• There have been few definitions of patterns of resilience in smart cities and related software 
ecosystems and how these can be used at an architectural level. There is a missing discus-
sion on how smart cities/critical ecosystems can become resilient, based on patterns
• How to perform ecosystem management of development of federated embedded systems 
(FES) used in smart cities (i.e., transportation, automotive systems…)
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